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Subaltern Urbanisation in India 
 
Eric Denis Partha Mukhopadhyay Marie Hélène Zerah 
Institut Français de Pondichéry Centre for Policy Research Centre de Sciences Humaines 
July 7, 2012 
Abstract 
This paper proposes an approach to urbanisation processes by defining a concept of subaltern 
urbanisation, which refers to growth of settlement agglomerations (which may or may not be 
denoted urban by the Census of India) that are autonomous and independent from the metropolis 
and interact with other settlements, whether local or global. Analysing conventional and new 
data sources  against the grain , it claims that there is support for the existence of economically 
vital small settlements, contrary to perceptions that India s urbanisation is low, its smaller 
settlements are stagnant and its cities are not productive. It offers a classification scheme for 
settlements using the axes of spatial proximity to metropolises and degree of administrative 
recognition (invisible, denied, contested and recognised), and looks at the potential factors of 
their transformation along economic, social and political dimensions. It concludes that much of 
Indian urbanisation is a distinct story; a  contribution made by the people on their own . Instead 
of basing policy on illusions of control, it is better to understand how agents make this world. 
Understanding this is critical for comprehending the ongoing Indian transformation. 
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Introduction 
It may be useful to begin by dissecting our title, since in our initial presentations of this work; it 
has been at the forefront of discussion. At one level, the phrase  subaltern urbanisation  is 
perhaps best seen as a literary device to focus attention on our area of inquiry, to increase the 
possibility of discursive engagement, arguably in the tradition of another such phrase, viz. 
 global city . As Robinson (2002) put it:  If the  global city  were labelled as just another 
example of an  industrial  district (perhaps it should rather be called: new industrial districts of 
transnational management and control), it might not have attracted the attention it did  (p. 536). 
At another level, we would be remiss if we did not acknowledge that there is a link, howsoever 
tenuous, with the wide literature on subaltern studies. In particular, there is an attempt in our 
work to interpret as Guha (1982) says, the  contribution made by the people on their own, that is 
independently of the elite  and a whiff of reading the official urbanisation data  against the 
grain . To engage with this aspect and locate our attempt within this intellectual tradition is 
outside the scope of this paper and our competence. It is for others, with a deeper understanding 
of this tradition, to critically appraise the relationship, if any. 
For the purposes of this paper, subaltern urbanisation refers to growth of settlement 
agglomerations (which may or may not be denoted urban by the Census of India) that are 
generated by market and historical forces which are not (a)  dependent  on large traditionally 
(economically) important settlements or (b)  planned  cities like Chandigarh and Bhubaneswar 
or industrial townships like Mithapur, in Jamnagar district, Gujarat.  The attempt is to 
investigate growth of settlements beyond that (i) driven by the economics of agglomeration, as 
advanced by the new economic geography, summarized by Venables (2005) or (ii) directly 
orchestrated by the state or private corporate enterprise. Of course, the involvement of the state 
cannot be abjured completely, e.g., the improvement of roads and the provision of electricity are 
all necessary elements in the growth of settlements. Some of these are not spatially directed 
towards a specific settlement. Others, such as the establishment of a mandi, are more spatially 
focused, but a more limited intervention, as compared to  planned  cities. 
It is useful at this stage to distinguish this notion from a few other concepts currently in use, 
such as subaltern urbanism, peri-urban, suburbanisation, rurbanisation and exclusionary 
urbanisation.  Roy (2011) offers two prominent themes, viz.   economic entrepreneurialism and 
political agency  (p. 227), while advancing the notion of subaltern urbanism. In spirit, there is 
substantive similarity in our approach, the main difference being that of the area and scale of 
inquiry. While subaltern urbanism is a very innovative conceptual theorization of the large cities 
of the South, it is located largely within the city. In comparison, our inquiry relates more to 
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cities as a system and their interrelationships.  Of course, as seen below, there is a similarity of 
approach in looking for the agency of the people in these cities, which may be ignored by policy 
makers and elites, but as noted above, we do not interrogate their subalternity.  
Since the recent past has seen considerable spatial expansion of large metropolitan cities, a 
growing body of research has focused on understanding their peripheries which are often seen as 
dependent on the core city for their economic base and as such peripheral growth would not 
satisfy the definition of subaltern urbanisation. However, in discussing the peri-urban, Dupont 
(2007) points to the diversity of these spaces, which she argues are not neutral in their location. 
Metropolitan peripheries are, in fact, complex structures resulting from a mix of planned 
operations and unplanned, uncontrolled processes and the flouting of regulations.  Urbanisation 
of the rural fringes, in consequence, covers a wide range of modalities  (p.93). It is possible 
therefore that there may be peri-urban growth is not  dependent  on metropolitan city, and thus 
subaltern urbanisation may exist even in the periphery of large metropolitan areas. 
Suburban development in North America is often seen as the mirror image of hollowing out of 
the core city. Suburbs were conventionally seen as residential spaces, with the city continuing to 
provide the economic basis. Over time, many of these spaces have acquired substantial 
economic activity, especially as the economy has moved from manufacturing to services. The 
inapplicability of the American model to other regions has also become more apparent. Recently 
Ekers, et al (2012) have defined suburbanisation as  the combination of non-central population 
and economic growth with urban spatial expansion  (p. 407) and include in their ambit the 
 process of constructing residential enclaves, squatter settlements, commercial developments, 
business and industrial parks, and fragmented infrastructure on the peripheries  (p. 407). This 
approach has many philosophical commonalities with ours, viz. (i) in according governance a 
central place and trying to understand it through connections between a variety of actors and 
processes, (ii) the focus on the question of land and change of land use, and (iii) the recognition 
of the embedded nature of local histories of places and the importance of idiosyncrasy, though 
subaltern urbanisation looks at locations well beyond the suburb. 
Kundu (2011a) provides a comprehensive delineation of his thesis on exclusionary urbanisation 
where the poor are relegated to the degenerated peripheries. The spatial dimension of poverty is 
also highlighted in the work of Murgai and Lanjouw (2010), where, using the technique of small 
area estimation
1
, they show increase in poverty, with increasing distance from the town. As will 
hopefully become clear below, though we share with Kundu his question of inclusiveness/ 
exclusiveness and the state of smaller settlements in terms of employment and basic amenities 
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and the apparent presence of a policy void, subaltern urbanisation perhaps differs from this 
approach in investigating the nature of agency available outside of the large cities, leading to the 
growth of small and medium-sized urban settlements where Kundu seeks his solution to the 
problem of exclusionary urbanisation.  
The possible interconnectedness of urban and rural in subaltern urbanisation is also central in the 
work of Revi et al. (2006) with their proposed concept of RUrbanism, which is  integrating the 
urban with the rural - so that there is a co-evolution of the countryside and of the city that is 
embedded within it  (p. 58). However, while the focus of RUrbanism is to think through urban 
design by understanding the  interstitial spaces  that remain between the city and the 
countryside with a view to overall sustainability and better understanding of urban-rural 
linkages, it is less concerned with the question of economic and social transformation per se, as 
well as with the question of governance of these urban centres. 
There are a number of possible intersections between these various concepts and subaltern 
urbanisation. To the extent that subaltern urbanisation may be occurring even in settlements 
located at the peripheries of large agglomerations, we are concerned with peri-urban and 
suburban governance. The foregrounding of autonomy in the concept of subaltern urbanisation 
means that it has to engage with what is happening within the city, in particular, the place of the 
informal city and the possibility of subaltern or occupancy urbanism in the sense of Benjamin 
(2008). The question of urban-rural linkages might become important to our inquiry, as one of 
the processes supporting subaltern urbanisation.  
Subaltern urbanisation differs from these in focusing on the extent of autonomy of the settlement 
from the metropolis, the extent to which it is on its own, not in the sense of autarky, but in the 
sense of being able to affect its growth process and interact autonomously with other 
settlements, whether local or global.  It also focuses on the spaces away from the metropolis. 
The existence of subaltern urbanisation should result in the emergence of vital smaller 
settlements outside the shadow of the large metropolis. Such settlements indicate a pattern of 
urbanisation that is extensive, widespread, economically vital and independent of the metropolis.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the pattern of 
urbanisation in India, arguing that it supports the existence of vital small settlements. The 
succeeding section initiates a conceptual framework for subaltern urbanisation by laying out the 
characteristics and a typology for subaltern urbanisation. The final section concludes. 
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Pattern of Urbanisation in India  
The extent and pattern of urbanisation in India raises concerns among many. The Planning 
Commission (2011) believes that  urbanization in India has occurred more slowly than in other 
developing countries and the proportion of the population in urban areas is only 28 per cent  (p. 
378). More recently, the results from the Census of 2011, and his inability to discern much 
industrialisation, prompt Nijman (2012), to infer that  rural-urban migration has been 
particularly significant to smaller cities, and that it is driven by the poor performance of the 
agricultural sector in the surrounding countryside rather than by a pull from increased 
industrialization in cities  (p. 14). He opines that the productive capacity of India s cities is a 
major obstacle to sustainable development.
2
 The same data from Census 2011 prompts Kundu 
(2011b) to worry about the  decline in demographic growth in districts within the metro cities, 
suggesting that these have become less welcoming to prospective migrants, [raising] concerns 
about exclusionary urbanisation  (p.10). On the other hand, the  small and medium towns, 
located away from the  emerging global centres of growth , particularly those in backward 
regions, have failed to attract substantial private investment  (Kundu 2011a: 21). He feels that 
the  urbanisation process has, thus, become concentrated in developed regions and larger cities 
in recent years, with backward areas and smaller towns tending to stagnate  (p.24).  The 
discussion below examines these three common assumptions, viz. India s urbanisation is low, its 
smaller settlements are stagnant and while its villages repel, its cities do not attract.  If true, the 
possibility for subaltern urbanisation would be low.  However, we shall show that these 
assumptions may be misplaced.   
How urban is India? 
Is India really as under-urbanised as usually stated? The definition of urban as recognised by the 
Census of India has been evolving over time.
3
  In 1872, the sole criterion for classification as a 
town was a population of 5,000. In 1881, it became much more subjective, defining a town as  a 
collection of numerous dwellings near each other within a limited area, having shops which 
provide a continual open market for the supply of goods, especially of manufactured goods . It 
thus brought in, however imperfectly, the two other categories that comprise the definition 
today, viz. density ( dwellings near each other within a limited area ) and the nature of 
economic activity. In 1891, the population size of 5,000 was reinstated as a criterion for 
settlements that were not under  Municipal or Chaukidari Act , emphasising that the place 
should not be  merely a large village, but should have some distinctly urban character, as that of 
a market town , in part, to exclude  a considerable number of the large aggregates of 
homesteads on the Malabar coast, which are merely revenue units of a purely agrestic nature . 
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The consequence of this definition was the identification of 2,035 settlements, containing 9.48% 
of the population, of which only 78 were more than 50,000 in size and 1,401 were less than 
10,000 in population. Subsequent census instructions repeated the injunction that it was 
 undesirable to classify as towns overgrown villages which have no urban characteristics , thus 
foreshadowing the attempt by Wirth (1938) to define urban areas by means of certain 
behavioural characteristics; requiring places called towns to possess  urban characteristics . 
Despite this injunction, the 1921 census managed to identify 1,040 settlements (comprising 22% 
of the urban population) that were  towns arbitrarily classified as such for census purposes , a 
close correlate to Census Towns today. The subsequent 1931 census saw a decrease in the 
number of such  arbitrarily classified  towns to 600, with 11% of the share of urban population, 
and an increase in the number of administratively designated towns by 699.   The first post-
independence census of 1951 did briefly allow that  places with a smaller population [than 
5,000] with definite urban character may be treated as separate towns , but the challenge to the 
size criterion was short-lived.  In 1961, the currently used three-fold definition came into being. 
It depends either on an administrative declaration of a settlement as an urban local body or on 
satisfying three conditions, viz. (i) size (greater than 5,000 persons in a settlement), (ii) density 
(more than 400 per square kilometre) and (iii) structure of the labour force (more than 75% of 
the male workforce in non-agricultural occupations).  
As a definition, this Indian definition is unique in the world.  This is to emphasize that the notion 
of urbanisation differs considerably across the world. Even where countries use a single 
parameter, such as population, the level could vary from as low as 200 in Greenland, Iceland and 
Norway to 20,000 in Turkey.
4
 Urbanisation using national metrics is therefore broadly non-
comparable across countries. There are efforts such as the e-Geopolis project
5
 that are 
attempting to apply a consistent measure across all countries and one of the authors is involved 
in that project.  However, completion of that effort is still some time away, though we shall later 
be presenting some of the information from the application of the measure to India.  
But, would the extent of Indian urbanisation really change under different lenses? Uchida and 
Nelson (2010) try to measure the extent of Indian population that lives within an hour s 
commute of a large town. They find, using data from the 2001 census (when the official 
urbanisation rate was 27.8%), that when the large town is defined as one with at least 100,000 
people, around 42.9% live within that zone, and more than half the population live within an 
hour of a town of at least 50,000 people. In comparison, the urbanisation rate of China does not 
change much with this adjustment from its official rate of 36%. According to this study, 
therefore, India was more urbanised than China in 2001. 
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The Indiapolis project attempts a different approach to this issue. It is a part of the global 
comparative e-geopolis project, which is trying to measure urbanisation with a common 
international definition using satellite imagery. An unit, called a settlement agglomeration (SA) 
for convenience (and to distinguish it from Urban Agglomerations, which is a known concept in 
the Indian census) is constructed on the basis of contiguous built up area, as discerned from 
satellite imagery, where contiguity is defined as built up areas that are less than 200 metres apart 
from each other. These SAs are then matched geo-spatially with the geo-codes of settlements 
from the Census of India
6
 to obtain their population and a cut-off level of 10,000 for each SA is 
used as a measure of urbanisation. A SA may therefore consist of multiple settlements. 
Reporting on the application of this approach Denis and Marius-Gnanou (2011) find that 
compared to towns with at least 10,000 inhabitants, which contained 26.6% of the population in 
2011, the SAs of more than 10,000 contained 37.5% of the population.  Some states showed 
more dramatic differences. While Kerala with its desakota settlement structure becomes almost 
entirely urban;
7
  among the larger states, Bihar (31.2% instead of 10.4%) and West Bengal 
(46.6% instead of 27.2%) show the largest difference between the agglomeration rate and the 
official urban rate. In large part, this is because these large settlements, especially in Bihar, fail 
to satisfy the official requirement that 75% of the male workforce must be engaged in non-farm 
work for a settlement to qualify as urban, reflecting the conflation of non-farm work with  urban 
character  in the Indian definition.  In part, India s comparatively low level of urbanisation 
depends on the inclusion of economic character as one of the characteristics. Internationally, this 
is an uncommon characteristic
8
. Using the same census data, but applying different filters, as 
shown above, reading the data  against the grain , as it were, the extent of urbanisation in India 
could look much higher. 
How concentrated is Indian urbanisation? 
We now examine the place of India s smaller cities. What is the spatial picture with respect to 
urbanisation in India? How diffused is it and are the urban areas outside the metropolis really 
stagnating? We examine this question using different metrics.  First, we look at the district level 
variations in overall population growth, second, we scrutinize the extent and location of the 
unprecedented growth of census towns over 2001-11, and third, we analyse the emergence of 
large towns over 1961-2011.  
District level variations in population growth  
The population of India has grown at 1.64 % per year over 2001-2011, with significant variation 
across states, e.g., Kerala grew at 0.48% over his period versus 2.26% in Bihar. While the rural 
Draftpaper,lasteditingbeforepublicationinEPW,July2012
7 

population has grown at 1.2%, the urban population has risen by 3.4% per annum over this 
period.  Population growth at the district level within state also shows similar variations. In a 
given state, some districts grow much faster than other districts. Mukhopadhyay and Pradhan 
(2012) have recently grouped states into six categories based on the location of their high-
growth districts.
9
 They are divided into districts that include the state capital, districts that border 
the district that includes the state or national capital, i.e., in the periphery of the state or national 
capital and those other districts. Furthermore, states are divided into those with a single high-
growth district, and those with more than one high-growth district. Five states, viz., Assam, 
Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, Nagaland, and Uttarakhand do not have any high-growth districts.   
Table 1 presents the results of this exercise for the states with at least ten districts.   
Table 1: Location of High-Growth Districts 
 Single Growth Centre Multiple Growth Centres 
District(s) including 
State Capital 
Karnataka  
Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, 
Orissa  
District(s) Peripheral to 
State or National 
Capital 
Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal 
Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab 
Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Jammu 
and Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh 
Other District(s) Jharkhand, Kerala Gujarat, Rajasthan, West Bengal 
There are two factors that are immediately apparent.  First, there is significant diversity in the 
pattern across states. Second, the state capital figures prominently in twelve of the seventeen 
states (twenty two, if one includes the even growth states) in the table. Apart from the five states 
of Jharkhand, Kerala, Gujarat, Rajasthan and West Bengal, the district that included the state (or 
national) capital or a bordering district was either the sole high-growth district or one of the high 
growth districts.  While Bengaluru is the only district with the state capital to be the sole high-
growth district
10
, Rangareddy near Hyderabad, Mohali near Chandigarh, Thane near Mumbai 
and Kancheepuram near Chennai were peripheral districts to the state capital that were among 
the high-growth districts in their states.  In addition, Gurgaon in Haryana and Ghaziabad and 
NOIDA in Uttar Pradesh were the districts near the national capital that were among the high-
growth districts in their states.  Thus, while Kundu (2011b) is correct in noting the decline in 
growth of the metropolitan centres (all of which are state or national capitals), in many states 
their peripheries are growing significantly faster than the rest of the state.  It is arguable whether 
it indicates that spatial proximity to the political centre is a factor in growth.
11
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Figure 1: Spatial Distribution of New Census Towns 
 
Source: Pradhan (2012)  
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Census Towns 
The Census of 2011 shows a large growth in census towns, i.e., urbanisation outside recognised 
urban local bodies. The sharp rise in these census towns has given rise to speculation (Kundu 
2011c) about whether this was part of an effort to increase the extent of urbanisation in India. 
The census towns themselves are identified ex-ante since the census schedules differ by urban 
and rural areas (in terms of amenities, etc.) and therefore can possibly be influenced by 
subjective bias on part of the census officials.
12
 While population data for 2011 from the census 
on these towns is awaited, Pradhan (2012) has studied the spatial pattern of these settlements 
using an unexploited source prepared by the Census of India, which lists all geographical units 
in 2011 and its mapping with 2001 census.
13
 Using the population of these settlements from the 
2001 Census, it is possible to obtain an estimate of the contribution of these census towns to the 
increase in urbanisation. Further, using the geo-codes of these settlements, it is also possible to 
study whether they are located in proximity to existing towns. 
Pradhan finds that 26% to 29.5%
14
 of the urban growth from 2001 to 2011 can be attributed to 
the recognition of new census towns, varying from a high of nearly 90% in Kerala and 60% in 
West Bengal to less than 10% in states like Karnataka and Gujarat. By contrast, only 8.4% of the 
growth in urban population over 1991 to 2001 was due to new census towns. Not all of this 
growth of census towns is occurring around existing large towns. Using a differentiated spatial 
buffer around towns above 100,000
15
, he finds that only 37.2%, or 926 (of 2489) settlements of 
these  settlements and 33.6% of the population fall within these buffers, indicating that much of 
this growth is outside the peripheries of existing large towns.  The spatial distribution of new 
census towns in Figure 1 shows that while there is a high concentration in certain districts close 
to metropolitan cities, the formation of census towns is also widely spread across the country.  
This indicates that the process of spontaneous transformation of settlements, reflected in the 
growth of census towns beyond metros, is a relatively widespread geographical phenomenon. 
Emergence of Large Cities 
The census has recently released data on the growth of urban agglomerations (UAs), which 
contain at least one town with a population of more than 100,000. There are 244 such UAs, of 
which 198 existed in 2001 and 46 are new additions. Comparing this data with the 198 urban 
agglomerations from the 2001 census, we find (see Table 2) that the share of total urban 
population in the old UAs has dipped slightly, from 53% to 51%, with most of the decline 
attributable to the larger UAs, above 1 million in size. However, the share of population in such 
UAs in 2011 has increased with the addition of new UAs, which comprise 4% of the current 
population (the core city constituting these UAs accounted for 2.9% of the population in 2001). 
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Furthermore, for the smaller UAs (less than 1 million) as a class, the growth of the UA is more 
than the core town, indicating possible peripheral growth even in smaller settlements.
16
 
Table 2 Growth of Urban Agglomerations and their Core City 
UA existing in 2001 New UA in 2011 
 
Less 
than 
500,000 
500,000 
to 1 
million 
More 
than 1 
million 
Less 
than 
500,000 
500,000 
to 1 
million 
Growth of UA population 2001-2011 3.0% 2.9% 2.3% .. .. 
Growth of Core City population 2001-2011 2.0% 2.0% 2.5% 1.3% 2.5% 
Share of Core City 76% 79% 72% 86% 84% 
Share of UA in Urban Population 2011 10.2% 7.0% 34.0% 2.1% 2.0% 
Share of Core City in Urban Population 2011 7.8% 5.5% 24.5% 1.8% 1.7% 
Share of UA in Urban Population 2001 10.0% 6.9% 35.7% .. .. 
Share of Core City in Urban Population 2001 8.4% 5.9% 25.3% 1.6% 1.3% 
Number of UAs 139 28 31 38 8 
What is the origin of these towns? In 2011, there are 497 class I towns, i.e., those that are more 
than 100,000 in population (including stand-alone class I towns that are not part of an UA). 
What were these towns like in 1961, the first year when the current definition of urbanisation 
was used? Table 3a gives the transition matrix in terms of number of towns while Table 3b 
provides it in terms of share of population. Of the 497 towns of more than 100,000 today, 37 did 
not have any reported population in 1961. Of the 232 that had a population of less than 50,000, 
two are today towns of more than one million. 
Table 3b shows that while 57% of the population of current million plus towns lived in towns of 
500,000 or more in 1961, 9% of the population were in towns of less than 100,000 or no 
reported population. Similarly, 29% of the population of current towns with population between 
500,000 to 1 million were in towns of less than 100,000 or no reported population. These 
transition matrices testify to the inherent dynamics of some of these small towns.  The fact that 
many large towns today were relatively small in the past indicates that the vitality of small 
towns is not a new feature of Indian urbanisation. 
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Table 3a Transition Matrix: Origins of Large Towns in 2011 
Size  
2011 
Size  
1961 
100,000 
to 
200,000 
200,000 
to 
300,000 
300,000 
to 
400,000 
400,000 
to 
500,000 
500,000 
to  
1 million 
More 
than 1 
million 
Total 
N.A. 16 11 2 3 3 2 36 
Less than 
50,000 
188 28 8 2 4 1 232 
50,000 to 
100,000 
60 35 15 5 6 5 126 
100,000 to 
200,000 
3 8 11 9 21 6 58 
200,000 to 
300,000  
1 
 
1 9 9 20 
300,000 to 
400,000 
        2 6 8 
400,000 to 
500,000 
          5 5 
500,000 to  
1 million 
          5 5 
More than 
1 million 
          7 7 
Total 267 83 36 20 45 46 497 
Source: Authors  calculation based on Town Directory 2001 and Census 2011 
 
Table 3b: Population share by size of town in 1961 
Size  
2011 
Size  
1961 
100,000 to 
200,000 
200,000 to 
300,000 
300,000 to 
400,000 
400,000 to 
500,000 
500,000 to 
1 million 
More than 
1 million 
N.A. 6% 13% 5% 14% 7% 2% 
Less than 
50,000 
67% 34% 22% 10% 10% 1% 
50,000 to 
100,000 
25% 41% 42% 25% 12% 6% 
100,000 to 
200,000 
1% 10% 31% 45% 43% 7% 
200,000 to 
300,000 
  1%   5% 23% 10% 
300,000 to 
400,000 
        5% 10% 
400,000 to 
500,000 
          7% 
500,000 to  
1 million 
          11% 
More than 1 
million 
          46% 
Source: Authors  calculation based on Town Directory 2001 and Census 2011 
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Of these 460 towns that existed in 1961
17
, there are 43 that have had an annual growth rate over 
fifty years of 4.7% or more, i.e., an increase in population by ten times over this period. While 
many of them are in the peripheries of large cities, ten do not belong to this category, viz. 
Nashik, Bhiwandi and Aurangabad in Maharashtra, Surat and Vapi in Gujarat, Rudrapur in 
Uttarakhand, Akbarpur in Uttar Pradesh, Saharsa in Bihar Dhanbad in West Bengal and 
Miryalaguda in Andhra Pradesh.  These are some of the possible candidates for a historical 
study of subaltern urbanisation, as to the factors that drove their growth. For example, while 
Miryalaguda is a rice town, the growth in Bhiwandi s powerloom sector follows the demise of 
the large mills in Mumbai.  Once the threshold growth rate is reduced to a less ambitious 4% 
(seven fold growth), and additional 27 towns are added (of these 70, only 10 were class I towns 
in 1961) and more such towns appear on the list. Thus, while the large metropolises remain of 
critical importance, there is also considerable growth that is happening outside of such areas. 
Economic Health of India s Urban Areas 
Is this relative dispersal of population growth the result of desperation, a la Nijman (2012) or is 
there an underlying broadening of the economic base?  The employment and unemployment 
surveys of the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) from 1993-94 to 2009-10 allows us to 
begin looking at this picture. 
The picture in Table 4 does show a move towards the metros, defined as cities of over a million, 
during the period 1993-94 to 2009-10, except for construction, where there is also a move 
towards rural areas. Between 2004-05 and 2009-10, there appears to be a pullback, but it is not 
clear whether the decline is part of an emerging trend of de-concentration accompanying the 
increase in growth rates, or whether it is attributable to a differential impact of the post financial 
crisis growth slowdown on metros, as compared to other urban centres. The shares from the NSS 
survey on migration in 2007-08 (in italics) are provided as a possible tentative indicator, 
recognising that the sampling scheme for the survey was different from the employment 
unemployment surveys and therefore they are not strictly comparable. Regardless of the shift 
towards metros, in all the sectors, including modern services, metros comprise less than half, 
and often less than a third of urban employment.  
While urban employment is predominant in most non-farm sectors, apart from mining, food 
manufacturing and other manufacturing, which comprise about 13% of urban employment and 
construction (which constitutes another 11%), considerable non-farm employment is also in 
areas classified as rural, reflecting the discussion on measurement of urbanisation.  Using a 
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different data set, Ghani, et. al. (2012) find that organised manufacturing appears to be growing 
relatively more in rural areas while unorganised manufacturing is growing in urban areas.   
Table 4: Employment Shares by sector  
Sector Share of Metros in Urban Share of Urban in Total 
 1993-
94 
2004-
05 
2007-
08 
2009-
10 
1993-
94 
2004-
05 
2007-
08 
2009-
10 
Mining 3.0% 8.3% 4.4% 8.4% 35.0% 33.1% 27.5% 26.6% 
Food Mfg. 10.6% 16.3% 13.7% 12.9% 35.2% 33.8% 38.7% 37.1% 
Clothing Mfg. 22.9% 33.2% 36.6% 33.8% 52.9% 58.3% 58.4% 61.7% 
Machinery Mfg. 39.0% 44.5% 48.5% 41.2% 70.2% 74.6% 74.6% 72.5% 
Other Mfg. 27.6% 35.3% 35.6% 32.8% 48.7% 48.6% 51.5% 52.1% 
Utilities 18.6% 28.6% 21.2% 17.7% 61.2% 57.7% 63.2% 65.8% 
Construction 24.4% 25.5% 22.5% 16.9% 43.3% 35.7% 34.6% 29.7% 
Govt. Services 28.5% 27.2% 29.1% 28.3% 65.5% 68.0% 69.4% 67.6% 
Traditional services 23.6% 27.9% 30.4% 27.5% 55.6% 54.7% 57.0% 54.6% 
Modern services 37.4% 45.0% 45.0% 42.5% 68.5% 72.6% 75.2% 76.6% 
Social services 19.9% 25.4% 23.1% 22.2% 51.5% 53.2% 51.9% 56.1% 
Household service 34.3% 42.6% 43.1% 46.6% 72.0% 71.1% 69.2% 66.3% 
Total 22.7% 28.7% 29.7% 27.0% 54% 53% 54% 52% 
Source: Authors  calculation based on respective NSS rounds 
Table 5 Employment Structure of Metros and Other urban areas 
 1993-94 2004-05 2007-08 2009-10 
 Metro 
Other 
Urban 
Metro 
Other 
Urban 
Metro 
Other 
Urban 
Metro 
Other 
Urban 
Mining 0.2% 1.7% 0.2% 1.1% 0.1% 0.9% 0.2% 0.9% 
Manufacturing 27.4% 27.9% 28.2% 24.9% 28.5% 24.3% 27.0% 23.1% 
Food Mfg. 1.8% 5.1% 1.6% 3.7% 1.3% 3.7% 1.3% 3.5% 
Clothing Mfg. 9.1% 10.1% 10.5% 9.3% 10.6% 8.5% 10.5% 8.2% 
Machinery Mfg 5.0% 2.6% 3.9% 2.1% 4.8% 2.4% 4.5% 2.6% 
Other Mfg. 11.6% 10.1% 12.1% 9.7% 11.8% 9.8% 10.7% 8.8% 
Utilities 1.2% 1.8% 0.9% 1.0% 0.7% 1.2% 0.7% 1.3% 
Construction 7.2% 7.5% 7.6% 9.7% 6.7% 10.7% 6.6% 13.0% 
Govt. Services 13.1% 10.9% 6.3% 7.4% 6.4% 7.2% 6.8% 7.0% 
Traditional svc 34.3% 36.9% 33.9% 38.6% 36.5% 38.6% 34.9% 36.9% 
Modern svcs 8.7% 4.8% 12.0% 6.5% 13.1% 7.4% 14.1% 7.7% 
Social services 5.0% 6.7% 6.3% 8.1% 5.2% 8.0% 6.1% 8.6% 
Household svc. 3.0% 1.9% 4.6% 2.7% 2.8% 1.7% 3.5% 1.6% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Authors  calculation based on respective NSS rounds 
This employment structure of urban areas does not appear to justify the kind of pessimism 
evident in Nijman (2012). While the structure of employment is shifting towards modern 
services, this is gradual, from 8.7% in 1993-94 to 14.1% in 2009-10 in the metros. 
Concomitantly, both manufacturing at over a quarter of the workforce (a little less in non-
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metros)
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 and traditional services at more than a third of the workforce (a bit more in non-
metros) have held their ground for the most part. Note that the ubiquitously mentioned 
household servant comprises less than 5% of the workforce. Combined with an overall annual 
growth in urban workforce of about 3%, this provides a strong basis for the economic robustness 
of urban India. The employment structure of non-metros reflects a diversified economic 
structure with a stable mix of traditional services, manufacturing and construction. Compared to 
metros, they have more of construction (as can be expected if they are in the process of 
increasing their built up area) and a little less of some types of manufacturing and modern 
services, which may benefit from co-location and agglomeration economies, but the share of 
these activities is by no means insignificant in their economic structure. 
Conceptual Framework 
All these aspects taken together point to a picture of urbanisation in India that is dispersed and 
diverse to an important degree.  The large cities are important and growing steadily, but in many 
cases (though not all) their peripheries are growing faster, a phenomenon even in smaller UAs.  
But 41% of the urban population lives outside the class I towns; and there is growth there too. 
Indeed the population share of non-Class I towns has risen in the last ten years. Contrary to 
popular impression, India may be more urbanised than appears from the official figures. A 
substantial share of national population, upwards of a 10%, lives in dense built up settlements 
that do not satisfy the Indian definition of urban areas. Clearly there is a need to go beyond 
metrocentricity, as argued by Bunnell and Maringanti (2010).  The Indian smaller town, far from 
being stagnant, appears to reflect growth and vibrancy. A number of them have grown steadily 
and they appear to have a diversified economic base. Even the urbanisation outside the 
administrative framework reflected in the explosive growth of census towns shows a diffused 
pattern, spread out beyond the metropolitan peripheries. It does indeed appear that an important, 
extensive and widespread segment of Indian urbanisation can satisfy our definition of subaltern 
urbanisation, i.e., it is economically vital and independent of the metropolis. In this section we 
attempt to characterise this subaltern urbanisation.  
Non-subaltern Urbanisation 
Since we had defined subaltern urbanisation in the negative, it is useful to begin by 
characterising non-subaltern urbanisation, which is of three kinds, as mentioned earlier, viz. (a) 
Metropolitan Urbanisation, (b) Administrative Urbanisation and (c) Corporate Urbanisation. 
Metropolitan Urbanisation: The Census of 2011 indicates that large metropolises, with the 
exception of Bengaluru are slowing down, but as seen above, growth is occurring around 
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metropolises. In form, this may be similar to suburbanisation and peripheralisation but it may be 
different in process. In pure suburbanization, population voluntarily leaves the city core and 
moves to the periphery and peripheralisation has a certain exclusionary aspect to it, where in 
people are either pushed out involuntarily (different from suburbanisation) or prevented from 
entering the city (through market or non-market factors).  This growth of the periphery may be a 
choice, driven by the diseconomies of the core city and its regulatory structure (some 
commonality with peripheralisation) and the possibility to access the required city services from 
the periphery. These services are not just urban services like water and sanitation, but the 
broader set of socio-economic services that a city provides, in terms of access to product 
markets and infrastructure, deep labour markets, social heterogeneity, etc. A special case of 
metropolitan urbanisation is capital urbanisation, where the city is also the state capital. As seen 
earlier, the location of the state capital is a factor in population growth in many states. 
The reason for excluding them from the subaltern category lies in the presumed dependence of 
this growth on the metropolis. There may however be instances of Type II error, i.e., false 
negatives, which we discuss below, where the location may be peripheral to a metropolis, but 
the process of urbanisation may be independent of it, i.e., it may be subaltern in character. 
Administrative Urbanisation: This refers to the creation of cities like Chandigarh, Bhubaneswar, 
Faridabad, Gandhinagar, etc. Such planning of new towns is no longer common, though there 
are some initiatives like the building of New Raipur that can be compared to the development of 
cities like Gandhinagar. However, the recent initiatives to develop cities along the proposed 
Delhi Mumbai industrial corridor can be the beginning of a new wave of new town development 
but it is debatable whether it should be seen as administrative or corporate urbanisation. 
Corporate Urbanisation: The most frequently mentioned example of corporate urbanisation is 
perhaps Jamshedpur, with a notified area of 59 sq. km. These refer to settlements where the 
corporate (private or public sector) sector is involved in development, often as part of a 
concomitant industrial activity. Large SEZs like the Mundra in Gujarat, which plan to develop 
over 100 sq. km. or Sri City in Andhra Pradesh are more recent correlates, a key differentiator 
being that these sites are not linked to a single large industry owned by the firm (though in the 
case of Mundra, the port can be said to perform a similar function). Of late, especially in 
Maharashtra, there have been developments like Lavasa, focused on urbanisation, where the city 
itself is positioned as the attractor of economic activity.  Where the corporate is state-owned, 
like the Bhilai and Bokaro steel plants or Kolar Gold Fields (Robertsonpet in Karnataka) or 
power plants like Singrauli and Ramagundam, the administrative and corporate features may 
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meld into one another. The governance of these settlements as an industrial township is usually 
outside the electoral framework, as permitted in the proviso to article 243Q of the constitution. 
Subaltern Urbanisation 
We denote urbanisation beyond the above three types as subaltern urbanisation in that they are 
not (a)  dependent  on large traditionally (economically) important settlements or (b)  planned  
cities. Based on the observed pattern of urbanisation discussed earlier, we try to characterise it 
on two axes, viz.  spatial proximity and administrative recognition.  On the spatial proximity 
axis, we consider two types, viz. (i) peripheral where the settlement is located in the periphery to 
the metropolis and (ii) non-peripheral, which are all other settlements. On the administrative 
recognition axis, we posit the following four types, viz. (a) invisible, where the settlement is not 
recognised as urban, as in many cases of settlement agglomeration discussed in Denis and 
Marius-Gnanou (2011); (b) denied, where the settlements meets the urban test of the census and 
is classified as a census town, but is not recognised administratively as an urban area; (c) 
recognised, where the settlement is recognised as an urban area, i.e., it is a statutory town and 
finally (d) contested, where the settlement is contesting its administrative status. The last can be 
of two sub-types; first, where the administrative classification is rural but the settlement wants to 
be recognised as urban and second, where the settlement wants to be rural but the administrative 
classification is urban. Conceptually, on the administrative recognition axis, it can be thought of 
as between denied and recognised.  These characteristics are discussed in more detail below. 
Since the spatial proximity and administrative recognition axes are independent, this gives rise 
to multiple types of settlements. For subalternity, a common character for all these types is 
independence from the metropolis and a degree of autonomy. It is also possible that subaltern 
settlements may have a mix of autonomous and dependent (on a metropolis) urbanisation 
processes, varying over time. Furthermore, autonomy does not imply the absence of a linkage 
between two settlements. 
Table 6: A Classification Scheme for Subaltern Urbanisation 
Administrative 
Recognition 
Spatial proximity 
Invisible Denied Contesting (I) Contesting (II) Recognised 
Non-peripheral      
Peripheral      
Note: Contesting (I) refers to a situation where the settlement wants to be urban but the administrative 
classification is rural, while the reverse situation is Contesting (II) 
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1. Peripheral settlements: Even when urbanisation occurs at the periphery of large cities, it is 
not necessarily dependent on the city. While observationally, the spatial pattern is similar to 
that expected under the agglomeration hypothesis advanced under new economic geography, 
the underlying processes may be different and more autonomous in character, thereby 
justifying classification as subaltern in our schema.  It is not our contention that all 
peripheral urbanisation is subaltern in character; just that subaltern urbanisation processes 
may exist even in close spatial proximity to metropolises. 
Consider the settlement of Gurgaon, at the periphery of Delhi. The population of Gurgaon 
district has grown by 5.7% per year over 2001-11, compared to the growth rate of Delhi of 
1.9%. The municipality of Gurgaon itself has grown by 15.9% per year, though some of this 
growth is due to the substantial expansion of its boundaries. Although it is located at the 
border of Delhi, is Gurgaon s growth necessarily dependent on Delhi?  
It is hard to reject the hypothesis that the initial growth of Gurgaon may have been 
dependent on Delhi and on the investment in the Maruti automobile manufacturing facility 
by the state. Furthermore, even the initial private investment by developers such as DLF can 
be seen as positioning Gurgaon as a suburb of Delhi, a settlement similar to DLF s earlier 
developments in Greater Kailash and Hauz Khas, currently neighbourhoods within Delhi. 
DLF foray into Gurgaon was arguably due to regulatory restrictions on private developers, 
imposed consequent to the formation of Delhi Development Authority (DDA).  
Today, however, Gurgaon s growth is driven by a mix of diverse activities. The modern 
services sector, located mostly to the north of the National Highway no. 8 and the associated 
urbanisation is a creature of (benign?) neglect by the state and local entrepreneurship. Much 
of the educated labour that powers this sector is drawn from the deep labour pool of Delhi. 
Growth has also been facilitated by the state-led development of a highway connecting 
Mumbai to Delhi, which runs through Gurgaon and the expansion of Delhi Airport for the 
Commonwealth Games. To the south of the highway is the manufacturing section of 
Gurgaon, anchored by the Maruti factory (now majority owned by Suzuki), but in many 
ways much more diverse in scope than just automobile and auto ancillaries, and powered by 
numerous small and medium enterprises in various sectors. For this sector, the relationship 
with Delhi s labour pool is much weaker. Gurgaon is now expanding, incorporating the 
industrial township of Manesar, 20km along the Mumbai highway. So, it is eminently 
possible that certain segments of Gurgaon s urbanisation processes may be autonomous and 
independent of Delhi.  In part, this will depend on whether the investments in transportation 
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infrastructure are viewed as spatially directed and how the labour linkages are seen. We 
provide this example to show that (a) the extent to which a settlement undergoes a subaltern 
urbanisation process may change over time and (b) all growth in the metropolitan periphery 
need not be dependent on the metropolis.  
2. Non-peripheral settlements:  These are towns located outside the periphery of large towns.  
We recognise that growth in a non-peripheral location is not a sufficient condition for 
subaltern urbanisation. For example, growth may be driven by consumption of remittances 
from a distant metropolis. An  autonomous  growth engine is needed. The power of this 
engine may vary, e.g., it is likely to be strong in the towns that have shown ten-fold growth 
over fifty years, e.g. Mirayalguda, Bhiwandi and Aurangabad. There will also be others 
which serve their region effectively, but without demonstrating the rapid growth seen in 
these towns.  Harda and Gobindgarh are two possible examples of such towns. 
Harda, located in the eponymous district of Harda (carved out of Hoshangabad in 1998) in 
Madhya Pradesh, for example, was established as a Nagarpalika by the British in May 1867.  
It is today a district headquarter town with rail links to Delhi and Mumbai, located on a 
national highway (NH 59-A connecting Indore and Betul), but the town has remained 
relatively small, with a population of 14,015 households in 2011, an increase of 1.8% since 
2011.  Nevertheless, it appears to be an important mandi town, a  dynamic marketplace, 
constantly interacting with the changing contexts of agricultural production, regional 
political dynamics, technological developments, processes of reform, and the penetration and 
contraction of different forms of agro-commercial capital .
19
 It has emerged as a  centre of 
commercial activities  for wholesale and retail in  garment, grocery, hardware, auto-parts, 
medicine, jewelry (sic), etc. [for] people from surrounding areas (around 18 villages) and 
even from cities like Timarni, Seoni-Malwa .
20
   
Gobindgarh is a town in Fatehgarh Sahib district of Punjab. Kundu and Bhatia (2002) 
examined how it became a hub of steel rolling and linked industries, despite  not having any 
perceptible locational advantage   being the node of raw material supply etc.  (p. 50).  Their 
explanation draws upon the history of entrepreneurship, fostered by proximity to Patiala, a 
well-developed network of middlemen and cost effective informal financing arrangements 
and risk sharing practices even in the labour market. Despite this nodal position, however, 
the population of Gobindgarh (17628 households in 2011, an increase of 3.9% over 2001) 
remains relatively small, though it has grown much faster (5.5% annually over 1961-2001) 
than Harda (2.7% p.a.).  
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The processes that sustain growth in such cities have been insufficiently explored. Small 
towns, which were earlier a locus of inquiry, e.g., Mathur (1982), now receive relatively 
little attention from academia.
21
 Indeed, small towns are arguably neglected even by the 
government. The clearest enunciation of this at the aggregate level is perhaps to be seen in 
the allocations of the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), the 
flagship national urban program. The program has four components, the UIG (Urban 
Infrastructure and Governance) and BSUP (Basic Services for the Urban Poor) for sixty 
three (now sixty five) specified cities, and then the UIDSSMT (Urban Infrastructure 
Development Scheme for Small and Medium Towns) and IHSDP (Integrated Housing and 
Slum Development Programme) programs for the other urban areas.  Figure 2 shows the 
share of allocation compared to the share of population in these different categories. Thus, 
while the sixty five cities have 42% of the population, they have received 79% of the 
allocations, while Class III cities (population between 20,000 to 50,000) have received only 
5% of the allocations, even though they have 15% of the population. Furthermore, of the 
1387 class III cities, only 277 have received funds under UIDSSMT and 194 under IHSDP, 
leaving out a large majority. The manner in which the people on their own cope with this 
neglect by the elite is yet to be studied. 
Figure 2: Share of JNNURM Allocations by size class of cities 
Note: These include allocations for UIG, BSUP, UIDSSMT and IHSDP.  Based on data from 
Ministry of Urban Development and Ministry of Housing and Poverty Alleviation.  
 
3. Invisible settlements:  Moving to the axis of administrative recognition, invisible settlements 
are those that are not seen as urban either by the administrative authorities or by the Census. 
They are neither statutory nor census towns and are classified as villages. Denis and Marius-
Gnanou (2011) indicate the possibility of urban-like growth in such settlements beyond 
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recognized areas of urbanisation.  As noted earlier, over 10% of national population may 
reside in such large dense built-up settlements.  An examination of the work profile of such 
villages in Bihar also shows that the proportion of male non-farm workers exceeds 50% in 
only a few (little over 10%) of them and is more than 75% (the census standard) in a 
negligible number.  The question here is whether the census standard is a reasonable 
measure of  urban characteristics . As noted earlier, only five other countries use such 
criteria in defining urban settlements. Gupta (2010) in her work on villages around Bhopal 
finds that much smaller settlements like Harra Kheda fulfil the role of an urban area, in terms 
of being a focal point for service provision and could possibly have been recognized as a 
town in 1951 as a  place with a smaller population [than 5,000] with definite urban 
character .
22 
While satellite imagery has indicated the possible existence of dense 
settlements outside recognised urban areas, their growth processes remain to be studied. 
4. Denied settlements: The next step along the administrative recognition axis is one where the 
settlement satisfies the three-fold criteria used by the census but does not receive statutory 
recognition. The number of such Census Towns increased by 2532 over 2001-11. The 
number of census towns in Kerala rose by 362 and that in West Bengal by 528, while Tamil 
Nadu (265) and Uttar Pradesh (201) were the other main contributory states. These four 
states accounted for more than half the increase in the number of census towns. On occasion, 
these settlements can be quite large. Of the 38 large CTs (more than 50,000 in population) in 
2001, 17 were in Delhi, and 15 in Jharkhand, West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh and the 
remaining in other states. 
It is also interesting to explore the interaction of invisibility and denial. Table 7 shows this 
intersection by size of SA and CT. A large number (1943) of the new census towns 
recognized in 2011 belong to one of the settlement agglomerations constructed on the basis 
of 2001 populations, with 825 of them being part of settlement agglomerations that are less 
than 50,000 in population.
23
 This leads to the interesting conjecture as to whether density in 
itself may bring about  urban character  in terms of non-farm work and whether this 
methodology can be adopted as a predictive tool to investigate the spatial direction of 
urbanisation. Whether or not there are distinct spatial characters in these new CTs vis-à-vis 
the other settlements in the SA, e.g., proximity to transport networks remains to be studied. 
All census towns, however, may not be denied settlements. Some of them may have 
successfully contested classification as a statutory town, opting to remain a village. It is 
perhaps not a coincidence that Kerala and West Bengal, the two states with the largest 
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number of census towns, should also be those with arguably the most empowered 
panchayats. It is possible that given the limited devolution of powers to the urban local 
bodies and the relatively large number of schemes focused on rural areas, it is more 
advantageous for a settlement to remain rural at least in those states where there is a certain 
finality of transition. In this context, it is important to note that case law on the subject in 
Kerala indicates that  there cannot be a transition of an urban area as a rural area .
24
 
Table 7: The Interaction of Invisibility and Denial in Select States 
 Size of SA 
Size  
of CT (2001) 
Less 
than 
50,000 
50,000 
to 
100,000 
100,000 
to 
200,000 
200,000 
to 
500,000
500,000 
to 1 
million 
More 
than 1 
million 
Total 
Not in 
SA 
New in 2011 825 137 163 137 70 611 1943 421 
<5000 69 26 48 40 19 91 293 372 
5,000-20,000 727 102 112 91 50 363 1445 45 
20,000-50,000 29 8 3 5 154 199 4 
50,000-100,000 1 1 1 3 6 
Existing 503 66 106 120 43 306 1144 35 
<5000 9 6 15 8 3 17 58 34 
5,000-20,000 439 52 84 89 33 201 898 1 
20,000-50,000 55 7 6 21 6 81 176 
50,000-100,000 1 2 6 9 
>100,000 1 1 1 3 
Source: Pradhan (2012) 
 
5. Contesting settlements (I): Settlements unhappy with their current classification, as noted 
earlier, are of two types.  The first are settlements currently administratively classified as 
villages (which may include census towns) that want to become urban. Such instances can be 
observed in Tamil Nadu, where settlements, unlike in neighbouring Kerala, change from 
urban to rural and back to urban at the pleasure of the state government. On 11 June 2004, 
the Government of Tamil Nadu directed the  reclassification of 566 town panchayats as 
village panchayats .
25 
 Prior to this,  according to section 3-B of the Tamil Nadu District 
Municipalities Act,1920, any local area having a population of not less than 5,000 and an 
annual income of not less than 1 lakh of rupees shall be constituted as a town panchayat.   
The government however determined that since  most of the town panchayats are financially 
weak, and rural in character,   town panchayats having a population of less than 30,000 may 
be reclassified as village panchayats so as to enable them to receive more funds from the 
Government of India and State Government under various grants and assistance.  (emphasis 
added).  It found that 93% of town panchayats (568 of 611) had a population of less than 
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30,000.  Of these 568, 183 agreed to revert back to being village panchayats but 385 refused, 
stating that  (i) the present set up of administration is essential to attend to the public needs 
and (ii) revenues from tax and other sources may decline.  However, since the Director of 
Town Panchayats reported that  the characteristics of the town panchayats which have 
opposed the reclassification are identical to the characteristics of the town panchayats which 
have agreed to the reclassification  (emphasis added), it was decided that all these town 
panchayats would be reclassified as village panchayats barring two settlements that had 
initiated legal proceedings, viz., Narasingapuram in Salem district and Punjai Puliyampatti 
in Erode district.  Thus, 385 settlements became instances of contesting settlements of the 
first type, villages contesting their classification and wanting to be towns. 
6. Contesting settlements (II): The ruling party changed in Tamil Nadu following assembly 
elections in May 2006. Soon after, on 14 July 2006, orders were issued to reconstitute 561 
village panchayats in question as town panchayats.
26
  In this case, 28 settlements passed 
resolutions stating that they wanted to remain classified as villages, but were nevertheless 
reconstituted as town panchayats, providing instances of second type of contestation, where 
settlements are classified as urban areas, though they want to be classified as villages.  
Another, better publicised, instance of the second type is the expansion of the Vasai Virar 
municipal corporation, near Mumbai, on 3 July 2009. A number of villages incorporated into 
the municipal corporation resisted joining it.
27
 Following this contestation, the state 
government of Maharashtra issued another notification on 31 May 2011 deleting 29 villages 
from the municipal corporation and adding two villages to its area. In its turn, the newly 
formed Vasai Virar municipal corporation challenged this notification in the Bombay High 
Court. Hearings are continuing, with the deletion of villages held in abeyance, i.e., the 29 
settlements remain classified as urban areas, though they want to be classified as villages.  
These examples demonstrate that autonomy is not only related to the growth process; it is 
equally important in the field of classification. These 561 settlements in Tamil Nadu and 29 
settlements in Maharashtra are currently classified as urban, though they may have just as 
easily been rural and in that case, unless they satisfied the test of being a census town, their 
populations would have been counted as rural. The politics of urban classification remains 
an open area for research. 
7. Recognised Settlements: Recognised settlements are the final step on the administrative 
recognition axis. These settlements may however, not satisfy the three-fold criteria of the 
census, but nonetheless be recognised as urban, since a state government has the right to 
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classify a settlement as a statutory town.  The non-peripheral towns of Harda and 
Gobindgarh described briefly earlier would be instances of such settlements.  
Process of Transformation 
In the 1980s, the role of small towns in the development process, the diffusion of urbanisation 
and their relationship with rural areas was the topic of important debates. Rondinelli (1983) 
emphasised the importance of the functional role played by small urban centres in creating rural-
urban linkages and contributing to an integrated and balanced network of places, a theme that 
Tacoli (2006) explores recently. The search was for balanced regional development in which 
small towns play the role of a transmission mechanism to the rural areas. Rondinelli found that: 
 Towns in India frequently contain a wide array of small retail stores, personal and commercial 
services, and small cottage-processing, fabricating or simple manufacturing operations... The 
economic activities found most frequently in Indian towns are weight-and bulk-reducing 
processing operations such as sugar mills, sawmills, abattoirs, canneries, and oil-crushing mills. 
These localized activities in turn create demand for transportation and supply services as well as 
for storage, financial and insurance services  (p. 386). While many such towns remain, others 
have become much more complex. 
For two decades, the considerable body of research on global cities, global-city regions and 
large metropolis, hid a large share of the urban population from view but it is now necessary as 
Bell and Jayne (2009) state, to  understand more fully the ways in which small cities attempt to 
develop competitive advantage in the global urban hierarchy, the ways in which small cities link 
with other cities (and non-urban places) and the forms that these linkages take.  (p. 689). Urban 
centres are part of city-systems, which implies a need to look beyond rural-urban linkages and 
understand their dynamics as urban centres per se, their linkages with other cities, including 
international global cities. Our central hypothesis is that important forces of transformation are 
to be found in the agency of the actors located in these settlements, which goes beyond their role 
as a transmission mechanism for trickle-down growth. The rapid changes of the last two decades 
in India call for such an endeavour if one considers that there is more to urban transformation 
than agglomeration economies and trickle-down effects.  
The core question of interest is the process of subaltern urbanisation and the manner in which it 
differs, if at all, from the processes seen in metropolises, e.g., agglomeration driven economies 
posited by theories of new economic geography. It is important to emphasise that it is not a 
question of absence or presence of globalisation. Subaltern urbanisation includes settlements 
that may be connected not just locally and nationally, but also globally. The leather clusters of 
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Ranipettai in Tamil Nadu or the knitwear driven growth in Tiruppur are possible instances of 
global connections in non peripheral locations. The process of transformation in these 
settlements and the manner in which it relates to the characteristics, i.e., whether the processes 
are affected by spatial location and administrative recognition, is a matter of ongoing research. 
Broadly, the drivers of this transformation, possibly intermingled and with feedback loops, can 
be grouped into three factors, viz. economic, social and political.  
Economic 
Various explanations could be related to the location and/or the relocation of economic activity 
in smaller urban centres or large villages. As noted earlier, Ghani, et. al. (2012) find that 
organised manufacturing appears to be growing relatively more in rural areas while unorganised 
manufacturing is growing in urban areas. An explanation could be related to the improvement in 
connectivity offsetting the higher land cost in larger cities as well as exemption of taxes in rural 
areas. These factors can trigger economic activities both in peripheries of large cities (such as 
part of the automobile sector in the periphery of Delhi) or in non peripheral areas. The examples 
of Harda and Gobindgarh and the clusters of Salem and Vellore point more towards 
agglomeration at a lower scale, with substantial exploitation of socio-cultural networks. For 
example, the cluster of Vellore includes the towns of Ranipettai, Melvisharam and 
Vaniyambadi. Ranipettai is a relatively small town of 11,659 households in 2011, but it is host 
not just to a large export-oriented leather cluster of small firms but also a fabrication industry 
(including a facility of Arcelor Mittal Dhamm) and among the earliest sanitary ware plants (part 
of the Parryware brand) in India. This raises a range of possible questions regarding the 
relationship between the small externally focused leather entrepreneurs and the large brand 
name firms and their respective spheres of autonomy and agency and, the manner in which it 
affects the process of urban development. This example brings about a critical question about 
the nature of capital and its relationship to the extent of autonomy, whether it is external to the 
settlement or local, including the result of surplus arising from agriculture
28
, and the channels 
through which it flows, e.g. the role of social, possibly caste-based, networks.  
Social 
A range of social changes may be occurring across small urban centres with possible variations 
across States. For instance, Krishnamurthy (2011) documents a process of moving to the town to 
avail education and health facilities, even as the economic drivers stay broadly rural. In 
Dharuhera, one of the sites studied by one of the authors, preliminary field work points towards 
a diverse set of strategies used by migrants; while families move to the town to benefit from 
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better infrastructure facilities, single male migrants remain in peripheral villages. Indeed, the 
increasing demand for quality education is perhaps underestimated as a reason for relocation, 
but this is just speculative conjecture at this time. There may also be other, possibly less 
mundane and more momentous social changes along the axes of caste and class that may be 
occurring as a result of market forces.
29
  Jeffery et al., (2011) describe some of these changes in 
small towns in UP, where they observe changing aspirations and lifestyles that impact education, 
housing and reproductive strategies. Of special interest is the manner in which social factors 
affect the preference structures and constraint sets, i.e., the degree of autonomy and capabilities, 
e.g., the interaction of social networks with capital accumulation and knowledge and access to 
markets beyond the settlement. 
Political 
The political changes that occur in a settlement with the change in its economic and social 
character are relatively poorly understood. It is also possible that political factors play a role in 
the process of transformation by conferring a heightened sense of agency on certain segments of 
the settlement s population. As seen above, political factors also play a role in classifying a 
settlement as rural or urban and the processes of contestation that emerge from such a 
classification. Typically, the nature of urban governance and the manner of implementation of 
the 73
rd
 and 74
th
 constitutional amendments have led to a situation in most states where urban 
local bodies are relatively more restricted than rural local bodies in terms of their autonomy, due 
to the influence of state development agencies and regulatory bodies. In addition to the higher 
number of the Union government schemes for panchayats, Bhagat (2005) mentions lower 
taxation, cheaper power and the absence of urban by-laws and regulations as incentives to 
remain rural. In contrast, once a settlement crosses a certain size, the provision of networked 
services, for which financial assistance can typically be accessed only by urban local bodies can 
access, may be seen as necessary. This can set up interesting optimisation exercises, e.g., 
between the freedom to develop land, which is more in rural areas and the level of public 
services and consequent value of developed land, which is more in urban areas. This balance 
will vary from one settlement to another with variations across states and will mobilize different 
actors and interests. Many villages oppose the move to become urban to preserve their lifestyles 
and arguably to avoid the type of land speculation prevalent especially in the periphery of 
metropolises. Other reasons for this resistance can be found in divergent political affiliations, a 
factor unexplored but potentially explaining resistance of some villages to being incorporated in 
larger towns. There may also be interactions with social factors, e.g., Sengupta (2012) finds that 
resistance by some villages to be included in the Malegaon Municipal Corporation is due to 
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religious reasons. While the city of Malegaon is largely populated by the Muslims, these villages 
are predominantly Hindu.
30
  
The politics of classification we have just discussed implicitly takes for granted that boundaries 
are fixed. However, this is not always the case. Examples of settlement agglomerations where 
one part of the settlement is classified as rural and another part as urban complicates the issue 
further. Two examples from preliminary field work in Uttar Pradesh illustrate the potential 
stakes involved. In the small town of Daurala
31
, an urban local body, a large tract of land is 
occupied by an industrial unit, which is declared as rural, thereby avoiding civic taxes. 
Consequently, there is a push by the urban local body to incorporate this area into the settlement 
in order to be able to levy taxes on the unit. In the case of the larger town of Sikandarabad,
32
 the 
separation between the town and the village is only visible because of a water leakage on the 
road, which reflects the difference in the infrastructure standards. However, the most recent and 
rapid  rural outgrowth  of Sikandarabad is reportedly orchestrated by the village pradhan, who 
owns houses given on rent, a cinema and a marriage hall. To avoid taxes and maintain political 
power in this area, he has built a coalition of interests that resist its inclusion into the town. 
Field Studies 
Field observation is therefore essential to understand the role of these various factors and their 
interrelationships in the study of subaltern urbanisation.  The use of large data sets, while 
important, is limited in understanding the processes that are leading to the transformation of 
these settlements.  It is necessary to be in the field and to conduct in-depth empirical research to 
distinguish between various forms of urbanisation and the extent and nature of autonomy in 
settlements, all too difficult to infer from available census and survey data. Krishnamurthy s 
(2012) observation that  agricultural markets are not easily analyzed from afar or powerfully 
illuminated from available statistical data [and] understanding how these disparate and dynamic 
markets operate therefore requires close engagement within particular regions, regulatory 
regimes, and market sites 
33
 is of relevance to the study of subaltern urbanisation, which 
requires a fine reading of local actors  agency in driving changes. To assess the level of 
autonomy of settlement agglomerations (whether peripheral or non peripheral), one needs to, 
inter alia, look carefully at the type and structure of capital and investments in these settlements, 
including for instance the manner in which land is mobilized and agricultural surplus is used, 
study the structure of labour markets and the role of local actors in influencing or resisting 
policies. In each of the categories we have defined, however, the specific processes that make 
the settlement as well the stakes around the governance question need to be uncovered. For 
instance, in the case of denied settlements, the stakes for not being classified and the potential of 
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divergent interests for or against urban status (both at the local and at the state level) needs to be 
interrogated. Finally, without local inquiry, it would be impossible to assess the urban character 
of dense invisible settlements, and whose urban character is currently cloaked in ambiguity.  In 
order to understand the role of these settlements within the urban system, field studies also need 
to go beyond the local story and recognize the rural-urban and urban-urban linkages and the 
relationships with various levels of government. This would reconnect with work on spatial and 
regional datasets that characterise their location and socio-economic context. Consequently, a 
sincere approach to understanding subaltern urbanisation requires a combination of field studies 
and analysis of spatial data and socio-economic data available through the census and national 
sample surveys, national and state accounts, etc.  
The interdisciplinary SUBURBIN project, which groups researchers from multiple institutions,
34
 
is currently engaged in this research agenda.  Analysis of large scale data, some of which has 
been explored to support our analysis here, is proceeding concomitantly with field work in a 
number of sites located across different states and likely to cover the range of settlements 
described earlier.  The current sites of inquiry of the project include Kullu and Shamsi in 
Himachal Pradesh, NCR towns like Dharuhera, Phulpur and Kushinagar in Uttar Pradesh, 
Pasighat in Arunachal Pradesh, Singur, Memari and Barjora in West Bengal, the Udupi region, 
the Salem region towns of Tiruchengode and Namakkal and the leather cluster of Vellore 
including the towns of Ranipettai, Melvisharam and Vaniyambadi in Tamil Nadu
35
. 
Conclusion 
The evolving evidence supports the claim of Ramachandran (1998) that the  Indian urban 
system is indeed basically a system of diversified cities  (p. 187). These cities have a resilient 
and robust economic base, which may be connected globally, sometimes bypassing the 
intermediation of the metropolis.  Unfortunately, there has been limited exploration of this 
diversity, but rather attempts to fit Indian cities into a broader global narrative, whether of 
 global cities  or  new economic geography .  However, as Markusen and Gwaisda (1993) have 
argued, even world cities differ depending on their domestic urban systems and many, as shown 
in Markusen and Schrock (1999), are specialising away from advanced producer services. To 
understand Indian cities and their economic trajectory, it is therefore useful to relook at the 
Indian urban system in its full richness. Since the  hollowing out  of the national state with 
globalization (Harvey1989; Brenner 1998) is not the case in India, given the lack of autonomy 
of city governments and the continuing political and economic salience of the state, this involves 
engaging with the role of the cities, whether subaltern or otherwise within the state. This 
exploration can be seen as part of what Robinson (2011) calls an  analytically nimble and 
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possibly experimental suite of comparative methods that are capable of responding to the array 
of urban experiences present in the world of cities  (p. 13). There are other very Indian reasons 
to focus away from the metropolis. Lanjouw and Murgai (2010) find that more than 80% of the 
urban poor live in small and medium towns. Furthermore, Himanshu, et. al (2010) argue that 
 rural non-farm diversification (and resultant rural poverty reduction), is found to occur more 
rapidly where there is consumption growth in neighbouring urban centres [and suggest] that the 
association is stronger if the urban centre is a small town than if it is a large city  (p. 38). The 
deeper links of the subaltern urban settlement means that their growth not only helps the urban 
poor, but also the rural poor in the vicinity. 
In the final analysis, the diversity and robustness of subaltern urbanisation shows the myriad 
ways in which Indian citizens take their destiny into their own hands often subverting patterns 
dictated from above. We are seeing spatial patterns emerge that represent an adaptive creativity 
that does not follow the logic of any canonical model. India seems intent as Nijman (2012) puts 
it, on  writing its own script  (p.18).  It is an urbanisation with a distinct story, a  contribution 
made by the people on their own , countering the claim of hegemonic narratives of space and 
identity. It incorporates the ungoverned areas like census towns as well as unrecognised areas, 
that we call settlement agglomerations.  Instead of basing policy on illusions of control we 
would do better to understand how agents make a world no state or theory could imagine. 
Understanding this is critical for comprehending the ongoing Indian transformation. Regardless 
of whether it will address theoretical and policy considerations, this alone would provide a firm 
rationale for focusing on what we call subaltern urbanisation. 
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Notes 

1 Small area estimation uses relationships estimated based on one survey, e.g., a household survey which 
has information on both independent variables (e.g. demographic information) and dependent variables 
(e.g. consumption information) to predict the dependent variable for a second survey (or census) which 
only has information on the independent variables but much higher sample size for smaller areas than the 
first survey. 
2
 Nijman (2012) tempers his conclusion by saying that  we are only just beginning to understand Indian 
cities in their entirety, this amalgam of human modes of survival and adaptation, of diverse modes of 
production, historical continuities and ruptures, disparate urban fabric, complex geographies, and 
vernacular representations of modernity  (p. 18) 
3 The following discussion is based on Mitra (1980) 
4 Japan has a cut-off level of 50,000 and it uses other critieria in addition. 
5 See http://www.e-geopolis.eu/ 
6 This was done for settlements (towns and villages) above 2,000 in individual population. The estimate 
of population in such settlement agglomerations is therefore underestimated to the extent that it excludes 
smaller settlements that may be part of the built up agglomeration. 
7 McGee T., 1991,  The emergence of Desakota Regions in Asia: Expanding and Hypothesis , in 
Ginsburg N., Koppel B. and McGee T., eds. The extended Metropolis Settlement Transition in Asia, 
Honolulu, University of Hawaï Press, pp. 3-25. This increase may reflects the colonial apprehension that 
such definitions may include  revenue units of a purely agrestic nature . 
8 Only Bostwana, Japan, Lithuania, Sudan and Zambia use economic criteria, apart from India. 
9 High-growth districts in a state are defined as those whose  population growth rate is more than 1.65 
standard deviations more than the population growth rate of the state, assuming that the population 
growth rate of districts in a state are normally distributed around the population growth rate of the state.  
In the state in which at least one outlier is obtained, the two districts with extreme population 
growth(districts with maximum and minimum population growth rate) are removed and then the above 
approach (mean ± 1.645 ×standard deviation) was reapplied to identify whether any new outlier 
district(s) were generated. If the second method generates new district(s), then it added to the existing 
outlier district(s) and they are classified as high growing districts Since the definition of high growth 
districts is with reference to the state population growth rate, it is possible that a high-growth district in 
one state may be growing at a much slower rate than a non-high-growth district in another state. 
Implicitly, this method assumes and controls for state specific factors that affect the population growth 
rate. 
10 This is not due to the expansion of the municipal limits of Bengaluru, since it relates to the population 
growth of the district as a whole. It is possible however, that the districts of the other cities, such as 
Hyderabad and Mumbai are smaller and more constrained in their ability to accommodate growth. 
11 This is a partial explanation. State capitals are also economic growth centres, which in turn may be 
partly related to their political power.  It is therefore difficult to distinguish whether it is proximity to 
economic or political power that leads to increase in population. 
12 Ex post, in 2001, there were 106 census towns with population less than 5,000, which accounted for 
2.18% of the total population of census towns and 0.16% of the total urban population.  In comparison, 
there were 123 statutory towns with population less than 5,000, comprising 0.14% of the total urban 
population 
13 Available at  http://egovstandards.gov.in/Mapping_location_codes.  This is the e-Governance 
Standards portal, which is part of the National e-Governance Plan (NeGP)  
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14 This upper end is obtained if the estimated population of these settlements for 2011 (by applying the 
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